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Introduction 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
(DIDMCA) was passed by the 96th Congress of the United States and signed into 
law by former President Carter on March 31, 1980. This legislation represents 
a major reform of our financial system. Many observers view DIDMCA as being the 
most far-reaching banking legislation passed since the 1930's. 
The key provisions of DIDMCA were: (1) NOW accounts were authorized 
nationwide for all depository institutions; (2) Deposit reserve requirements 
were restructured, simplified and applied to all depository institutions; (3) 
Thrift institutions were granted expanded lending authority; (4) The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Committee(DIDC) was created and charged with the gra-
dual elimination of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on deposits; (5) 
Federal Reserve System services were to be competitively priced and made 
available to all depository institutions. 
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The major objective of DIDMCA was to increase competition. Free market 
forces, it was argued, would lead to increased overall efficiency in the finan-
cial system. Another underlying objective was to provide a "level playing 
field" on which commercial banks, thrift institutions, credit unions and others 
could compete on equal footing. Clearly, however, the move from regulation 
toward freer competition has had differential impacts on the various providers 
and consumers of financial services. This article summarizes the findings of a 
study of the opinions of those directly affected by deregulation • .!/ 
The Data 
Mail-in questionnaires were sent to the chief executive officers 
(C.E.O.'s) of 116 insured commercial banks, and 84 insured savings and loan 
associations (S&L's) in March, 1981. The number of these institutions included 
in the sample represent their respective shares of total assets held by all 
banks and S&L's in Ohio. Useable questionnaires were returned by half of those .,J 
surveyed. 
The questionnaire consisted of 13 sections, of which 11 were statements 
with which the respondent could agree or disagree and 2 were in the form of a 
short answer or comment. The results are reported in the form of a numerical 
scale on which +2 • strongly agree, +l • agree, 0 • undecided or neutral, 
-1= disagree, and -2= strongly disagree. One of the 11 statements was omitted 
from the analysis, due to apparent misinterpretation by the respondents. The 
results obtained from each of the remaining 10 statements are reported for the 
two separate sample categories--banks and S&L's. Responses were also analyzed 
l/ See Mace, Barbara J. "Deregulation of Depository Institutions," unpublished 
honors thesis, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The 
Ohio State University, May 1981. 
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for differences between small, medium and large institutions based on asset size 
for banks and S&L's c0111bined; however, these results were, for the most part, 
not statistically significant. 
Summary statistics are shown for each of the 10 statements in Table 1. The 
mean or average response, which can be r~garded as being the "center of gravity" 
of each group's distribution, may assume any value between +2 (strongly agree) 
and -2 (strongly disagree). The standard deviation may be viewed as a measure 
of unanimity among the respondents in each category. For instance, with respect 
to a particular issue or question, a relatively small standard deviation 
reflects a greater degree of consensus among its members cOlllpared to a sample 
group with a larger standard deviation. Differences in responses between the two 
sample groups were analyzed with the t-test for differences between means. The 
F-test for equality of variances was also applied. Results for statements 3, 4 
5 and 7 where the standard deviations are significantly different should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Results 
Statement 1. Your institution fully supports the phase-out of Regulation Q. 
The opinions of bank and S&L C.E.O.'s differed tremendously with respect to 
their support of the phase-out of Regulation Q. While the majority of the bank 
C.E.O.'s support the phase-out, the majority of S&L C E.O.'s did not. The com-
paratively high standard deviations indicate a general lack of consensus among 
the respondents. 
The lack of support from the S&L respondents presumably reflects their con-
cern about losing the one-quarter percentage point differential between rates 
paid by banks and S&L's on most small denomination deposits. Also, S&L assets 
consist largely of long term, fixed-rate mortgages and their profit margins are 
more seriously threatened by the predicted increase in the cost of funds 
resulting from the phase-out of Regulation Q. 
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Statement 2. Due to the gradual elimination of Regulation Q, the cost of funds ~ 
for financial institutions will become extremely rate sensitive. 
The majority of all respondents agreed that their cost of funds will become 
extremely rate sensitive with the gradual elimination of Regulation Q ceilings. 
The slightly higher mean S&L response would seem to indicate stronger agreement 
with this statement, and the mean responses from banks and S&L's were signifi-
cantly different. The relatively low standard deviations indicate a higher 
degree of consensus on this issue. 
Statement 3. Due to deregulation, mergers and consolidations will greatly 
reduce the number of financial institutions. 
Although the majority of all respondents expect the number of financial 
institutions to be greatly reduced due to mergers and consolidations, a higher 
percentage of S&L respondents expect this reduction. The relatively low stan-
dard deviation of the S&L responses reflects a greater unanimity toward this 
issue. 
It was widely believed that some financial institutions could not withstand 
the transition from regulated, to free-market competition. Because of the 
longer term structure of their assets, thrift institutions have experienced 
greater difficulty in adjusting to the increased cost of funds, and the S&L 
responses to this statement reflect this concern. 
Statement 4. As a result of deregulation, both the assets and liabilities of 
financial institutions will become shorter term in nature. 
A majority of the respondents expect both assets and liabilities to become 
shorter term in nature, and the difference in the mean responses of bank and S&L 
CEO's is not statistically significant. The S&L respondents were more unifol'll 
in their opinion than the bank respondents. 
' 
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Regulation Q, and in many parts of the country, state usury laws, have in 
effect protected interest rate spreads. Deregulation has forced financial 
institutions to shorten the term structure of their assets and liabilities so 
that rates charged on loans can be more quickly adjusted to changes in the cost 
of funds. 
Statement 5. Competition between commercial banks and other thrift institutions 
will be greatly increased as a result of deregulation. 
There appears to be widespread agreement that competition between commer-
cial banks and thrift institutions will be greatly increased as a result of 
deregulation. The slight difference between the mean responses from banks and 
S&L's is not statistically significant. 
Their responses suggest that both bank and S&L CEO's feel that the DIDMC 
Act of 1980 will indeed "level the playing field". Elimination of the quarter-
point rate differential on deposits will enhance the ability of commercial banks 
to attract funds. Expanded lending authority for S&L's will permit them to 
diversify into consumer installment loans and other areas traditionally reserved 
for commercial banks. 
Statement 6. As a result of deregulation, we will view a substantial shift of 
funds from those institutions operating primarily with money market funds into 
commercial banks and other thrift institutions. 
The majority of the respondents did not'expect a substantial shift of funds 
from money market funds to banks and thrifts. The relatively high standard 
deviations, coupled with the large number of "neutral" responses, indicate a 
general lack of consensus on the probable effects of deregulation on competition 
for funds. 
Commercial banks and thrift institutions have always experienced disinter-
mediation whenever market rates rose above Reg. Q ceilings, and since 1978, 
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the growth in money market fund assets has been phenomenal. The gradual phase- ..J 
out of Reg. Q will eventually allow depository institutions to pay whatever 
rates they believe are necessary to attract and retain deposits. However, until 
the phase-out is complete in 1986, the unregulated money market funds will con-
tinue to enjoy an advantage. Perhaps the C.E.O.'s negative responses to State-
ment 6 reflect their opinion that DIDMC will have little immediate impact on 
their ability to compete with money market funds. 
Statement 7. ~our institution fully supports doing away with the interest rate 
differential between banks and other thrift institutions at the completion of 
the six-year phase-out of Regulation Q. 
Not surprisingly, there were major differences between the responses of 
banks and S&L's, and their mean responses are located near opposite ends of 
the scale. The majority of bank respondents favor doing away with the interest 
rate differential while the majority of S&L respondents favor retaining it. 
Moreover, the bank respondents displayed a greater degree of consensus, while 
the S&L respondents were more varied in their responses. In other words, the 
percentage of S&L respondents who favor doing away with the differential is 
greater than the percentage of banks who do not favor doing away with the dif-
ferential. Positive responses from C.E.O.'s of large S&L's account for a major 
portion of this variance. 
Statement 8. Your institution is in favor of the reformed method of policy-
making as represented by the newly formed Deregulation Committee. 
The mean responses to this statement from banks and S&L's differed signifi-
cantly. While the percentage of bank respondents in favor of the DIDC is very 
similar to the percentage not in favor, almost 50 percent of the bank officers 
were undecided or neutral. In contrast the majority of S&L respondents were not 
' 
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(., in favor of the Committee. The degree of consensus is very similar for both 
banks and S&L' s. 
' 
' 
Clearly, the DIDC did not receive a strong vote of confidence from the sur-
~ey respondents. The five voting members on the Committee represent the 
interests of banks, thrift institutions, credit unions, regulatory agencies and 
the Treasury. However, comments on our survey forms indicate that some in the 
thrift industry believe that they are under-represented. The negative responses 
of the S&L CEO's to Statement 8 reflect their relatively greater degree of skep-
ticism of the DIDC. 
Statement 9. Deregulation will help to ease the inflationary pressures in our 
economy. 
To the extent that deregulation leads to greater rewards for saving and 
higher borrowing costs, the incentive to spend will be reduced and inflationary 
pressures should be eased. However, the overwhelming majority of both bank and 
S&L CEO's do not expect deregulation to help ease inflationary pressures. The 
mean S&L response reflects stronger opposition to this statement, as compared to 
the mean bank response. This difference is further exaggerated due to the rela-
tively large percentage of undecided or neutral bank respondents. The degrees 
of unanimity are quite similar for both sample categories. 
Statement 10. Deregulation will significantly increase deposits by "small 
savers". 
The overwhelming majority in each category of banks and S&L's did not 
expect deposits by "small savers" to be significantly increased. There is rela-
tively less unanimity among bank respondents, as a larger percentage of bank 
respondents are in agreement or were undecided on this issue, as compared to the 
S&L respondents. 
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The responses to Statement 10 merely reaffirm those to Statement 9. In 
other words, the respondents apparently do not believe that the elimination of 
Regulation Q will stimulate savings. Again, the respondents may be reflecting 
the opinion that there will be no significant impact until Regulation Q is 
completely phased out. 
NOW Accounts 
As provided in the DIDHCA, all financial institutions were given the 
authority to offer NOW accounts to the public, effective January 1, 1981. The 
questionnaire included a section designed to measure the extent of NOW account 
~fferings three months after the effective date. 
Of the depository institutions surveyed, 88 percent were offering NOW 
accounts to their customers by March, 1981. Commercial banks accounted for a 
larger portion of this .percentage than did the S&L's. NOW accounts were offered 
by 98 percent of the banks surveyed, compared to only 77 percent of the S&L's. 
The percentage of depository institutions offering NOW accounts increased with 
asset size. For example, 74 percent of the small, 92 percent of the medium, and 
all of the large institutions were offering NOW accounts three months after 
they were permitted to do so for the first time. 
Although a smaller percentage of the savings and loan associations surveyed 
offered NOW accounts, the S&L's that did offer NOW accounts tended to have lower 
minimum balance requirements than banks. Of the S&L's offering NOW accounts, 79 
percent had minimum balance requirements that varied between $100 and $749. In 
contrast, 84 percent of the banks that offered NOW accounts had minimum balance 
requirements of $1,000 and above. 
.. 
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Reasons for Deregulation 
In the last section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to list 
what, in their opinion, were the major reasons or factors contributing to dere-
' 
gulation. It should be stressed that not all respondents held uniform opinions 
regarding the causal factors underlying deregulation. Therefore, an attempt has 
been made to summarize the more prevalent and representative responses given. 
A large number of respondents from both banks and savings and loan asso-
elations cited lobbying efforts by consumer interest groups as being a major 
factor contributing to the deregulation of depository institutions. Many 
respondents believe there were extremely strong political pressures on both 
Congress and the Administration by these consumer groups. 
Many of the respondents stated that high inflation in our economy was 
another important reason for deregulation. However, as noted in Statement 9, 
most of these responses were not based on the belief that deregulation would 
help ease inflation. Rather, many of the respondents stated that high inflation 
contributed to deregulation indirectly by reducing the incentive for saving due 
to the decrease in purchasing power. 
Also given as a major reason for deregulation was the need for depository 
institutions to function in a more competitive, "free market" atmosphere. 
However, there were many respondents who disagreed with this competitive 
reasoning. Many respondents in favor of allowing market forces on interest 
rates to move freely stated that increased competition would improve financial 
efficiency and would help to prevent disintermediation. 
A large number of respondents from savings and loan associations strongly 
believe that lobbying efforts by large commercial banks and by the American 
Bankers' Association were a major factor contributing to deregulation. On the 
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other hand, many respondents from commercial banks felt that the desire by many .J 
savings and loan associations to increase their financial powers was a major 
factor. 
f 
Summary 
The phase-out of interest ceilings and the elimination of the rate dif-
ferential is supported by the majority of the bankers surveyed while the 
majority of the S&L officers surveyed do not support either. The overwhelming 
majority of all survey respondents expect deregulation to cause various changes 
in the financial industry. They are as follows: the cost of funds will become 
extremely rate sensitive, both assets and liabilities will become shorter term 
in nature, competition between commercial banks and thrift institutions will be 
increased significantly, and the number of financial institutions will be 
greatly reduced due to mergers and consolidations. 
The results of the questionnaire do not support one of the consumer bene- .J. 
fits deregulation is supposedly intended to deliver. The overwhelming majority 
of those surveyed do not expect deposits by small savers to be significantly 
increased. However, the results do reflect an increase in the variety of ser-
vices offered to consumers. For instance, NOW accounts were offered by a 
substantial majority of the depository institutions surveyed. Although a 
smaller percentage of the savings and loan associations surveyed offered NOW 
accounts, the S&L's that did offer NOW accounts tended to have lower minimum 
balance requirements than banks. 
The newly formed Deregulation Committee did not receive a strong vote of 
confidence from those surveyed. While nearly half of the banks surveyed were 
undecided or neutral regarding this reformed method of policy making, the 
overwhelming majority of the S&L CEO' s surveyed were not in favor 0f the new 
Committee. 
. ~ .. 
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"' Of the total group surveyed, a slight majority did not expect a substantial 
\ 
shift of funds from money market funds to commercial banks and thrift institu-
tions. Also, most of the depository institutions surveyed disagreed that dere-
gulation will help to ease inflationary pressures in our economy. 
In Retrospect 
A smoothly functioning, and efficient financial system depends heavily on 
public confidence and trust, thus, total deregulation is unlikely. DIDMCA was 
merely intended to eliminate some of the over regulation dating back to the 
1930's when drastic intervention was needed to restore a "safe and sound" 
banking system. 
As noted in a March, 1982 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual 
Report " ••• the promise of DIDHCA is yet to be fulfilled.... The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Committee, charged by DIDHCA with the responsibility 
L., to phase-out Regulation Q ceilings on deposit interest rates by 1986, has, to an 
extent, been stymied. A phase-out schedule adopted in June [1981) was over-
• 
\ 
turned in the courts the following month. An increase in the ceiling rate on 
passbook accounts adopted September [1981) was withdrawn following a flurry of 
protest." 
The slow pace of the phase-out of Regulation Q is, to some extent, 
understandable. The beleagured thrift industry would no doubt experience even 
more failures if Regulation Q ceilings were abruptly lifted, and widespread 
failures in the financial sector would seriously undermine public confidence in 
the system. However, the fact remains that more than two years after DIDHCA, 
small denomination deposits continue to earn less than half the yields earned on 
risk-free instruments such as US Treasury bills. Thus, s~e of the skepticism 
expressed by our survey respondents in March, 1981 seeas to have been justified. 
Several thrift institutions and banks have failed, and others have been 
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salvaged only through consolidations and mergers, most of which were arranged ...J 
by the deposit insurance agencies. Borrowers are indeed experiencing the 
painful adjustments to free market competition, but small savers are not 
enjoying the predicted rewards. Moreover, the playing field has been only 
partially levelled. The quarter-point differential remains, and many thrifts 
are more concerned with survival than with exercising their newly acquired 
lending powers. Money market funds, still exempt from Regulation Q ceilings 
and reserve requirements, continue to enjoy a competitive advantage in the 
quest for funds. 
, 
( 
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Table 1. -- Statistical Summary of Survey Reeults 
Statement Means Standard Deviation 
Banks S&L's Banks S&L's 
l +o.44 
-1.02* 1.40 1.23 
2 +l .46 +l. 73* 0.65 0.62 
3 +o.88 +l.48* 1.01 0.63* 
4 +l .16 +1.46 0.85 0.59* 
5 +l .43 +1.48 0.58 0.79* 
6 -0.25 -o. 7 5* 1.02 1.04 
7 +1.35 
-1.14* 0.88 1.29* 
" 8 +o.06 -1.30* 0.95 0.98 
9 -0.71 -1.25* 0.82 0.89 
10 -0.71 
-1.02* 1.08 0.83 
* Significant at the 5 percent level or better 
• 
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